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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
 For centuries, judges, not juries, have decided the amount and 
reasonableness of claims to recover attorney fees in both the state and federal 
courts of the United States. In fact, no jurisdiction had ever interpreted its 
constitution to find a right to a jury trial on the amount and reasonableness of 
a claim for attorney fees.1 That changed in 2012. 
                                                 
1 The one exception to this is a claim for attorney fees arising from an attorney-
client relationship. 
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 On March 14, 2012, the Minnesota Supreme Court became the first 
court to interpret its jurisdiction’s constitution to find a right to a jury trial for 
a claim to recover attorney fees. In a 5-2 decision, the majority found that the 
Minnesota Constitution “provides a right to a jury trial for a claim to recover 
attorney fees based on a contract.”2 The dissent called the decision “a historic 
change in practice for Minnesota courts” that “casts Minnesota as an outlier 
among jurisdictions that have considered the issue.”3 Because the Minnesota 
Supreme Court is the last word on the Minnesota Constitution, there is no 
“legislative fix” for those who disagree with the decision. United Prairie is 
here to stay for the foreseeable future. 
 Whether the majority “accurately” interpreted the Minnesota 
Constitution has, and will be, dissected by judges and lawyers across the 
country.4 These individuals will have a clear and well-written analysis to 
dissect. 
 Minnesota’s district court judges, lawyers, and litigants, however, 
face a more immediate problem because United Prairie left Minnesota’s 
district court judges and lawyers with no guidance on how to implement this 
decision. As a result, Minnesota’s district court judges and lawyers must 
apply United Prairie against a centuries-old system of statutes, rules, and 
case law that never contemplated this result.5 Because district judges and 
lawyers cannot wait for further guidance, or look to another jurisdiction as a 
model, they will have to adapt in real-time and on a case-by-case basis as 
they try to fit the proverbial square peg in the round hole. This may result in 
a patchwork of varying practices and procedures across Minnesota’s 289 
district court judges, 87 counties, and 10 judicial districts.6 
                                                 
2 United Prairie Bank-Mountain Lake v. Haugen Nutrition & Equip., LLC, 813 
N.W.2d 49, 53 (Minn. 2012). 
3 Id. at 63–67. 
4 Grant M. Borgen, Note, Recent Minnesota Supreme Court Decisions: Civil 
Procedure: The Civil Right to a Jury Trial and What It Means for Minnesota Creditors in 
Light of United Prairie Bank-Mountain Lake v. Haugen Nutrition & Equipment, LLC, 39 WM. 
MITCHELL L. REV. 245 (2012). 
5 Langeland v. Farmers State Bank, 319 N.W.2d 26, 33 (Minn. 1982). The 
Minnesota Supreme Court has recognized some common law exceptions to this rule. See, e.g., 
Kallok v. Medtronic, Inc., 573 N.W.2d 356, 363 (Minn. 1998) (stating that the “third-party 
litigation exception . . . permits a court to award attorney fees as damages if the defendant’s 
tortious act thrusts or projects the plaintiff into litigation with a third party”); In re 
Redetermination of Benefits of Nicollet Cnty. Ditch 86A, 488 N.W.2d 482, 487 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 1992) (recognizing an exception to general rule “where the victorious litigant has 
conferred a substantial benefit that can be spread proportionally among an ascertainable 
class”) (citing Grassman v. Minn. Bd. of Barber Exam’rs, 304 N.W.2d 909, 912 (Minn. 
1981)). 
6 Judicial District Leadership, Minn. Judicial Branch, http://www.mncourts.gov/ 
Documents/0/Public/administration/Judicial_District_Leadership.pdf (last visited Apr. 10, 
2013). 
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 The best efforts of able and diligent district court judges will, 
however, lack the necessary consistency and predictability lawyers and 
litigants need to analyze their legal claims. The resulting uncertainty will 
result in an already over-burdened district and appellate court system having 
to resolve a slew of motions and appeals looking for clarity and 
predictability. In the meantime, litigants making decisions about lawsuits that 
have significant impact on their lives and businesses will be burdened with 
higher legal costs, delays, and uncertainty in evaluating their claims. 
Because the practical problems that arise from litigating and trying 
claims for attorney fees to juries challenge the cost-effective and efficient 
administration of justice, the existing statutes and rules must be revised to 
provide rules and guidelines to assist district court judges and lawyers.7 The 
starting point for any such endeavor is to evaluate the statutes, rules, and 
practices in place before United Prairie.  
 
II.  BACKGROUND 
 
A. Applications for Attorney Fees Before United Prairie 
 
The “American Rule” calls for litigants to bear their own costs of 
litigation, including attorney fees absent a statutory or contractual basis for 
the claim.8 Minnesota follows the “American Rule.”9 Minnesota has also 
followed the common practice of having judges decide the reasonableness 
and amount of attorney fees.10 
Minnesota Rule of General Practice 119, which codified the practice 
of submitting attorney-fee claims to judges, is exceedingly broad in scope.11 
First, it imposes a requirement that “any action or proceeding in which an 
attorney seeks the award, or approval of attorneys’ fees in the amount of 
$1,000.00 or more . . . , application for award or approval of fees shall be 
made by motion.”12 Second, it identifies the “Required Papers” that must 
                                                 
7 See infra text accompanying notes 110–124 (proposing standard procedures 
and guidelines the legislature should adopt to assist district court judges and lawyers). 
8 See, e.g., Barr/Nelson, Inc. v. Tonto’s, Inc., 336 N.W.2d 46, 53 (Minn. 1983). 
9 See United Prairie Bank-Mountain Lake v. Haugen Nutrition & Equip., LLC, 
782 N.W.2d 263 (Minn. Ct. App. 2010), rev’d on other grounds, 813 N.W.2d 49 (2012) 
(“Finally, we note that there is no history in Minnesota of turning such fee determinations 
over to juries.”); MINN. GEN. R. PRAC. 119. 
10 United Prairie, 782 N.W.2d at 270. 
11 MINN. GEN. R. PRAC. 119.  
12 MINN. GEN. R. PRAC. 119.01. In full, the rule states: 
In any action or proceeding in which an attorney seeks the 
award, or approval, of attorneys’ fees in the amount of $1,000.00 for the 
action, or more, application for award or approval of fees shall be made by 
motion. As to probate and trust matters, application of the rule is limited 
to contested formal court proceedings. Unless otherwise ordered by the 
court in a particular proceeding, it does not apply to: 
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accompany a motion for attorney fees, and outlines the information to be 
included in the attorney’s affidavit supporting the motion.13 Third, it gives 
the district court judges the discretion to “require production of additional 
records,” either “for review by all parties or in camera review by the 
court.”14 The Advisory Committee comments explain that “rule authorizes 
the court to review documentation required by the rule in camera” because in 
camera review or submission of redacted records “is often necessary given 
the sensitive nature of the required fee information and the need to protect 
the party entitled to attorneys’ fees from having to compromise its attorney’s 
thoughts, mental impressions, or other work product in order to support its 
fee application.”15 Finally, Rule 119.05 was adopted in 2003 “to establish a 
procedure for considering attorney fees on matters that will be heard by 
default.”16 
The Advisory Committee comments—which “do[] not reflect [the 
Minnesota Supreme Court’s] approval of the comments”17—explain that the 
purpose of the Rule is “to establish a standard procedure for supporting 
requests for attorney fees.”18 In particular, the “rule [was] intended to 
provide a standard set of documentation that allows the majority of fee 
applications to be considered by the court without requiring further 
information.”19 The comment goes on to explain that, while the “rule is not 
intended to limit the court’s discretion, [it] is intended to encourage the 
streamlined handling of fee applications and to facilitate filing of appropriate 
support to permit consideration of the issue.”20 Judges and attorneys relied on 
the Rule to determine attorney fees until the Minnesota Supreme Court 







                                                                                                                   
(a) informal probates, 
(b) formal probates closed on consents, 
(c) uncontested trust proceedings; and 
(d) routine guardianship or conservatorship proceedings, 
except where the Court determines necessary to 
protect the interests of the ward. 
Id. 
13 MINN. GEN. R. PRAC. 119.02. 
14 MINN. GEN. R. PRAC. 119.05 advisory committee’s cmt. (1997).  
15 Id. 
16 MINN. GEN. R. PRAC. 119.05 advisory committee’s cmt. (2003). 
17 Minnesota Supreme Court Order, No. CX-89-1863 (Dec. 8, 1997). 
18 MINN. GEN. R. PRAC. 119.05 advisory committee’s cmt. (1997).  
19 Id. 
20 MINN. GEN. R. PRAC. 119.05 advisory committee’s cmt (2003). 
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B. United Prairie Bank-Mountain Lake v. Haugen 
 
1. The Facts 
 
 The facts giving rise to United Prairie are fairly unremarkable and 
unfortunately commonplace following the economic slowdown of the 
2000s.21 The Haugens “owned two parcels of land in Cottonwood County, 
Minnesota on which they farmed and operated a feed mill business.”22 They 
ran into financial problems in 2002 and had trouble making timely payments. 
United Prairie Bank-Mountain Lake (the “Bank”) agreed to refinance the 
debt.23 The Haugens’ debt was “secured with a mortgage on the two parcels 
of land in Cottonwood County, commercial security agreements, and 
personal guarantees executed by the Haugens.”24 The loan documents all 
included language requiring the Haugens to pay the Bank’s attorney fees and 
costs in the event of a default.25 
 
2. The District Court Proceedings and Decision 
 
 The Haugens defaulted on the loan documents in 2004.26 The Bank 
sued for breach of contract and sought to recover its attorney fees and costs 
of recovery.27 The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the 
Bank on its contract claims and dismissed the Haugens’ counterclaims.28 The 
                                                 
21 United Prairie, 813 N.W.2d at 52. The court reasoned that: 
The promissory notes accompanying each of the new loans obligated the 
Haugens and HNE to pay all costs of collection, replevin . . . or any other 
or similar type of cost. The notes further stated: [i]f you hire an attorney to 
collect this note, I will pay attorney’s fees plus court costs (except where 
prohibited by law). The mortgage required HNE to pay attorneys’ fees, 
court costs, and other legal expenses that were incurred by [UPB] in 
enforcing or protecting [UPB]’s rights and remedies under this Mortgage. 
The commercial security agreements provided that, in the event UPB 
repossessed the secured property or took action to enforce the obligations 
of HNE, UPB could apply any proceeds recovered to the expenses of 
enforcement, which includes reasonable attorneys’ fees and legal 
expenses. Finally, in the personal guarantees, the Haugens agreed to pay 
all costs and expenses (including reasonable attorneys’ fees and legal 
expenses) incurred by [UPB] in connection with the protection, defense or 
enforcement of [these guarantees] in any litigation or bankruptcy or 
insolvency proceedings. 
Id. (quotations omitted). 
22 Id.  
23 Id. 
24 Id.  
25 Id. at 52. 
26 United Prairie, 813 N.W.2d at 53. 
27 United Prairie, 782 N.W.2d at 267–68. 
28 Id. at 269. The court stated: 
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district court denied the Haugens’ request for a jury trial and awarded the 
Bank $403,821.82 in attorney fees.29 
 
3. The Court of Appeals Decision 
 
 In 2010, a three-member panel of the Minnesota Court of Appeals 
affirmed the district court’s decision to deny the Haugens’ request for a jury 
trial on the Bank’s attorney-fees claim.30 The Court of Appeals, borrowing 
heavily from the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Ross v. 
Bernhard, looked to three factors to determine whether “the nature of the 
issue to be tried” is “legal” or “equitable” in nature: (1) the treatment of the 
issue before the merger of law and equity; (2) “the remedy sought”; and (3) 
“the abilities and limitations of juries.”31 The Court of Appeals, relying on 
precedent from a number of different jurisdictions, found that all three 
factors led to the conclusion that the Haugens did “not have a right to a jury 
trial on the issue of attorney fees.”32 
 The Haugens appealed to the Minnesota Supreme Court. On March 
14, 2012, the Minnesota Supreme Court published its opinion in United 
Prairie, sixteen months after it first heard oral argument on November 3, 
2010.33 The court granted the Haugens’ petition for review to decide 
“whether the Minnesota Constitution provides a right to a jury trial for a 
claim to recover attorney fees based on a contract.”34 A five-member 








                                                                                                                   
To determine whether a party is entitled to a jury trial under the Seventh 
Amendment, federal courts look to the nature of the issue to be tried rather 
than the character of the overall action. The nature of the issue is 
determined by considering (1) how the issue was customarily treated prior 
to the merger of the courts of law and equity (the pre-merger custom), (2) 
the remedy sought, and (3) the abilities and limitations of juries. 
Id. (quotations omitted). 
29 United Prairie, 813 N.W.2d at 53. 
30 Id. at 49; Minnesota Supreme Court En Banc Calendar, http://www.mncourts. 
gov/Documents/0/Public/Calendars/November_2010_Summary.htm (last viewed Apr. 24, 
2013). 
31 United Prairie, 813 N.W.2d at 60. 
32 United Prairie, 782 N.W.2d at 270. 
33 United Prairie, 813 N.W.2d at 56; Minnesota Supreme Court En Banc 
Calendar, supra note 30. 
34 United Prairie, 813 N.W.2d at 49. 
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4. The Supreme Court Opinion 
 
a. The Majority Opinion 
 
The majority opinion looked to “the substance of the claim, based on 
the pleadings and the underlying elements of the claim, and ‘the nature of the 
relief sought.’”35 As to the first factor, the majority characterized “the 
substantive nature of the claim for the recovery of attorney fees [as] an action 
for contractual indemnity,” which the majority explained had been 
“traditionally classified as an action at law.”36 As to “the nature of the relief 
sought,” the majority “conclude[d] that a claim for a monetary payment 
under a contractual indemnity provision is a legal claim with an attendant 
right to a jury trial under Article I, Section 4 of the Minnesota 
Constitution.”37 
The majority then disposed of the Court of Appeals’ opinion. The 
majority opinion rejected the notion that an attorney-fee claim was “‘more 
like a claim for restitution than for compensation’” and “‘collateral’ to the 
merits of the action.”38 The majority concluded that the attorney-fee claim in 
the case was not a claim for restitution, but one for compensation.39 The 
majority went on to find that the claim was not collateral reasoning that 
“[w]hen a party seeks attorney fees under the express provisions of a 
contract, the fees are an agreed element of damages available under the 
contract and are not collateral.”40  
The majority also refused to: 
 
distinguish between the predicate determination of [the 
Haugens’] liability for attorney fees and the amount of the 
fees awarded as damages. As with any other legal claim 
subject to a jury trial, a jury determines both the liability for 
a breach of contract and the amount of damages to award for 
the breach, if any, assuming genuine issues of material fact 
                                                 
35 Id. at 53.  
36 Id. at 56. 
37 Id. at 57 (emphasis added). But see Spaeth v. Plymouth, 344 N.W.2d 815, 825 
(Minn. 1984) (“Accordingly, we hold that a claim for attorney and expert fees pursuant to 
section 117.045 should be treated as a matter independent of the merits of the litigation.”); In 
re Thulin, 660 N.W.2d 140, 143 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003) (citations omitted) (explaining that 
“[i]n Spaeth, the supreme court held that a claim of attorney fees and expert fees should be 
treated as an independent matter” and that “[t]he Court reasoned that the matter was 
independent because the court need not reconsider the merits of the issue on appeal to reach 
conclusions regarding fees, and as a practical matter, if the district court had not entered the 
order setting the fees, the appellate court would have been required to remand for further 
proceedings if and when it upheld the district court on the merits”). 
38 United Prairie, 813 N.W.2d at 58. 
39 Id. at 58. 
40 Id. at 59. 
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exist with respect to both questions that warrant submission 
to a jury.41 
 
Notably, the majority opinion also expressly rejected the Court of Appeals’ 
decision to consider the practical challenges of having juries decide attorney 
fee claims, observing that “[t]he availability of a constitutionally guaranteed 
right to trial by jury does not and should not turn on the practical difficulties 
of its implementation.”42 Finally, the majority opinion offered no guidance 
on how to submit claims for attorney fees to lay juries: 
 
We express no opinion, however, about the specific 
procedural or timing requirements for submission of a 
contractual attorney-fees claim to a jury. In this case, the 
parties have asked us to decide only whether the Minnesota 
Constitution provides a jury trial right for a claim involving 
a contractual right to attorney fees. We therefore decline to 
speculate about issues beyond those presented for our 
review.43 
 
b. The Dissent 
 
The dissent, authored by Justice Dietzen and joined in by Chief 
Justice Gildea, “conclude[d] that the [B]ank’s claim for attorney fees is akin 
to a claim for costs or disbursements, which does not implicate the right to a 
jury trial under the Minnesota Constitution.”44 The dissent acknowledged 
that the matter was one of first impression in Minnesota, but asserted that 
Minnesota “ha[s] consistently treated a contractual claim for attorney fees as 
sui generis and a matter for the court to decide.”45 The dissent described the 
claim for attorney fees as “is in the nature of a request for costs or 
disbursements” and implicated “traditional equitable principles” that do not 
implicate a right to a jury trial.46 The dissent was careful to point out that its 
analysis and reasoning should be limited: 
 
to the circumstances presented by [United Prairie]—where 
the attorney fees sought are in the nature of costs of 
collection or expenses of enforcement in connection with a 
                                                 
41 Id. Contra id. at 63 (the majority disagrees with the dissent’s treatment of an 
attorney-fee claim as sui generis and for treating attorney fees akin to costs and 
disbursements). 
42 Id. at 60. 
43 United Prairie, 813 N.W.2d at 63 n.9. 
44 Id. at 64 (Dietzen, J., dissenting). 
45 Id. at 65. 
46 Id. at 66. 
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breach of contract claim in the same action, in contrast to 
cases where the claim for attorney fees arises from an 
attorney-client relationship.47 
 
The dissent went on to predict that “the majority’s rigid, wooden approach—
treating attorney-fees claims like claims for contractual indemnity without 
considering the unique nature of attorney-fees claims—would extend the 
constitutional jury trial right to any claim for costs or expenses that springs 
from a contractual obligation.”48 
To Justice Dietzen and Chief Justice Gildea, “[t]he majority’s 
decision represents a historic change in practice for Minnesota courts, which 
have decided attorney-fees claims for the last century and a half.”49 And 
                                                 
47 Id. at 67 n.13. 
48 Id. at 67. 
49 United Prairie, 813 N.W.2d at 66 (Dietzen, J., dissenting). The dissent begins 
by reminding the majority that the Minnesota Supreme Court “protects the same jury trial 
rights as those protected under the Minnesota Constitution.” Id. at 67. Then, it cites to the 
federal circuits that have reached a contrary result: 
For example, the Second Circuit has concluded that the 
‘collateral’ issue of the amount of reasonable attorney fees due under a 
contract does ‘not present the kind of common-law questions for which 
the Seventh Amendment preserves a jury trial right.’ McGuire v. Russell 
Miller, Inc., 1 F.3d 1306, 1315 (2d Cir. 1993). Other circuit courts of 
appeal have reached similar conclusions. E.g., E. Trading Co. v. Refco, 
Inc., 229 F.3d 617, 627 (7th Cir. 2000) (concluding that ‘[t]he issue of 
attorney fees (including amount)’ due under a contract constitutes “an 
issue to be resolved after the trial on the basis of the judgment entered at 
the trial,” just as in cases involving statutory entitlements to attorney 
fees); Ideal Elec. Sec. Co. v. Int’l Fid. Ins. Co., 129 F.3d 143, 150, 327 
U.S. App. D.C. 60 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (“Where a claim for attorney’s fees 
arises from a private contract provision, such a claim does not embody a 
right to trial by jury.”); Resolution Trust Corp. v. Marshall, 939 F.2d 274, 
279 (5th Cir. 1991) (holding that the Seventh Amendment does not 
guarantee a jury trial to determine the amount of reasonable attorney fees, 
as no common law right exists to recover attorney fees awarded pursuant 
to a contract). 
Id. at 67. The dissent also points to the six state courts that have reached a conclusion contrary 
to the majority in United Prairie when interpreting their own state constitutions: 
Although state courts have relied on different rationales, they all 
have reached the same conclusion—there is no constitutional right to a 
jury trial on a claim for attorney fees based on a contract. See, e.g., Cheek 
v. McGowan Elec. Supply Co., 511 So. 2d 977, 979 (Fla. 1987) 
(explaining that “the recovery of attorney’s fees is ancillary to the claim 
for damages”); Hudson v. Abercrombie, 258 Ga. 729, 374 S.E.2d 83, 85 
(Ga. 1988) (reasoning that “attorney fees were not allowable at common 
law”); Missala Marine Servs. Inc. v. Odom, 861 So. 2d 290, 296 (Miss. 
2003) (concluding that trial court properly “h[e]ld a hearing after the trial 
of the case to hear evidence on the issue of attorney’s fees”); State ex rel. 
Chase Resorts, Inc. v. Campbell, 913 S.W.2d 832, 836 (Mo. Ct. App. 
1995) (noting the “absence of any authority that Missouri has recognized a 
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significantly, the dissent believed that the decision “casts Minnesota as an 
outlier among jurisdictions that have considered the issue,” after becoming 
“the only court in the country that recognizes a constitutional right to a jury 
trial under these circumstances.”50 The dissent observed that “courts deciding 
the right to a jury trial on an attorney-fees claim under the United States 
Constitution have universally concluded that there is no right to a jury 
trial.”51 Then, the dissent identified decisions from four federal circuit courts 
and six state courts that have reached decisions contrary to the majority 
opinion in United Prairie.52 Despite the dissent’s reservations, the majority 
opinion serves as the final word and may signal an expansion in the right to a 
jury trial beyond contractual attorney fee claims.  
 
C. The Application of United Prairie Beyond a Contractual Claim for Fees  
 
Although the majority tried to limit its holding to claims based on a 
contractual attorney-fee clause, the underlying reasoning of the majority 
opinion will most likely lead to an extension of United Prairie to other 
claims for attorney-fees context.53 At least one court has already extended the 
right to a jury trial beyond the contractual attorney fee context since United 
Prairie. 
 In St. Jude Medical v. Biosense Webster, Inc., St. Jude Medical sued 
BioSense, Johnson & Johnson, and a former St. Jude/current BioSense 
employee for breach of a noncompetition agreement, breach of a duty of 
loyalty, and tortious interference.54 Among the claims made by St. Jude was 
a claim for attorney fees based on the common law exception to the 
American Rule that “permits a court to award attorney fees as damages if the 
defendant’s tortious act thrusts or projects the plaintiff into litigation with a 
                                                                                                                   
common law right to a jury trial to determine reasonable attorney’s fees 
once liability has been established”); Paramount Commc’ns Inc. v. 
Horsehead Indus., Inc., 287 A.D.2d 345, 731 N.Y.S.2d 433, 434 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 2001) (“The amount of, if not the right to, attorneys’ fees raises 
post-judgment issues collateral to the merits in the nature of an accounting 
that are essentially equitable in nature.”); Murphy v. Stowe Club 
Highlands, 171 Vt. 144, 761 A.2d 688, 701 (Vt. 2000) (holding that 
determining the amount of attorney fees due under a contract involves 
equitable accounting). 
Id. at 68. 
50 United Prairie, 813 N.W.2d at 67 (Dietzen, J., dissenting). 
51 Id. 
52 See, e.g., Kallok, 573 N.W.2d at 363 (citations omitted). 
53 United Prairie, 813 N.W.2d at 67 (Dietzen, J., dissenting). 
54 St. Jude Medical S.C., Inc. v. Biosense Webster, Inc., No. 62-CV-11-718, 2012 
WL 8009745 (Minn. Dist. Ct. July 16, 2012); St. Jude Med. S.C., Inc. v. Biosense Webster, 
Inc., 2013 Minn. App. Unpub. LEXIS 913 (Minn. Ct. App. Oct. 7, 2013), petition for review 
denied, 2013 Minn. LEXIS 765 (Minn. Dec. 17, 2013). 
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third party.”55 Following United Prairie, BioSense responded by demanding 
a jury trial on St. Jude’s claim for attorney fees.56 
 The court in St. Jude found that United Prairie’s “reasoning is too 
compelling to be limited to the facts of that case.”57 It reasoned that St. 
Jude’s claim for attorney fees was “not some matter collateral to the merits 
of the tort claim” and was “part and parcel of its merits.”58 The court went on 
to reason that St. Jude’s “pursuit of Kallok fees constitutes a tort action 
seeking only money damages, and a ‘tort action seeking only money 
damages is a legal claim with an attendant right to a jury trial under the 
Minnesota Constitution.’”59 
 The court dismissed St. Jude’s “well-founded practical objections” 
because it believed that the Minnesota Supreme Court “didn’t much care that 
a jury trial on attorney’s fees might be laden with procedural baggage.”60 The 
court went on to invite “suggestions from counsel on how best to proceed 
efficiently.”61 
 In addition to common law exceptions like the Kallok exception, 
Minnesota has hundreds of state statutes and rules that permit the recovery of 
attorney fees.62 Litigants will no doubt test the boundaries of United Prairie 
by calling for its application for these various statutory fee claims for years 
to come. 
 
III.  ANALYSIS 
 
A. The Practical Difficulties of Litigating and Trying an Attorney-Fee 
Claim to a Jury 
 
 The Honorable Edward Devitt offered the following challenge to the 
civil jury system over thirty years ago: 
 
The complexities of modern life mirrored in our legal system 
raise the increasingly important question of whether a jury 
selected from voter lists, reflecting the age, education, and 
experience of a cross section of citizens is really competent 
                                                 
55 Plaintiff’s Memo. Regarding Kallok Attorney Fee Claim at 10, St. Jude, No. 
62-CV-11-718, 2012 WL 8009745, (Minn. Dist. Ct. July 16, 2012) (quoting Kallok, 573 
N.W.2d at 363). 
56 St. Jude, 2012 WL 8009745, at 15. 
57 Id. at 16. 
58 Id.  
59 Id. (quoting United Prairie, 813 N.W.2d at 54). 
60 Id. at 17. 
61 Id. (citing United Prairie, 813 N.W.2d at 63 n.9). 
62 Attorney Fee Awards in Minnesota Statutes, Minnesota House of 
Representatives Research Department (December 2011), http://www.house.leg.state.mn.us/ 
hrd/pubs/attyfee.pdf (last visited May 21, 2013). 
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to decide today’s complex cases. I suggest that many cases, 
by their very nature, are beyond the abilities of the average 
person to understand and fairly decide. Because of the 
required trial time and the complexity and difficulty of the 
legal and factual issues involved, certain cases should not be 
submitted to juries. I urge that modern realities dictate that 
we change the obligatory jury system in civil cases in order 
to preserve fair trials and to improve the efficiency and 
economy of the whole legal system.63 
 
His words have more relevance in Minnesota today than ever before. 
As litigation has gotten larger and more expensive over the last few decades, 
juries have been asked to decide increasingly complex civil cases and sift 
through an ever-increasing volume of evidence. None of these challenges, 
however, may pose more of a challenge to juries, trial lawyers, and district 
court judges than litigating and trying attorney-fee claims to juries.64 
To understand the difficulties in implementing United Prairie, it is 
helpful to identify what information a party making an attorney-fee claim 
needs to prove.65 Minnesota courts use “the lodestar method for determining 
the reasonableness of . . . attorney fees.”66 The lodestar method calls for the 
fact-finder to “determine the number of hours reasonably expended on the 
litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate.”67 “In determining ‘the 
                                                 
63 Edward J. Devitt, Should the Jury Trial Be Required in Civil Cases? A 
Challenge to the Seventh Amendment, 47 J. AIR L. & COM. 495 (1982). 
64 Although juries have decided the reasonableness of attorney fees in other 
contexts, United Prairie stands alone in calling for the simultaneous presentation of evidence 
regarding liability, damages, and legal fees for work done in the same lawsuit. J.R. Simplot v. 
Chevron Pipeline Co., 563 F.3d 1102, 1115–16 (10th Cir. 2009); see also McGuire v. Russell 
Miller, Inc., 1 F.3d 1306, 1308 (2d Cir. 1993); Resolution Trust Corp. v. Marshall, 939 F.2d 
274, 279 (5th Cir. 1991); E. Trading Co. v. Refco, Inc., 229 F.3d 617, 627 (7th Cir. 2000). 
These cases all distinguish between “free standing” attorney-fee claims where the damages 
“are themselves part of the merits of their contact claim”—such as a legal malpractice claim, 
collection claim for legal services performed, or claim for contractual indemnity arising from 
legal fees incurred in a separate lawsuit—from claims in which the fact-finder is being asked 
to make a determination of the reasonableness of attorney fees it is incurring in the lawsuit 
being tried to the jury. J.R. Simplot, 563 F.3d at 1115–16. In fact, United Prairie appears to be 
the only court to not draw such a distinction or deem the challenges posed by the distinction 
worthy of consideration. 
65 It is possible that the factors presented to juries for resolution of attorney-fee 
claims may be different, or at least framed differently, than the factors judges were permitted 
to consider in deciding claims for fees. See, e.g., St. Jude, 2012 WL 8009745. 
66 See supra note 62 and accompanying text (explaining the Supreme Court’s 
lodestar approach to reasonable attorney’s fees). 
67 Green v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 826 N.W.2d 530 (Minn. 2013) (citing 
Specialized Tours, Inc. v. Hagen, 392 N.W.2d 520, 542 (Minn. 1986)) (adopting the Supreme 
Court’s lodestar approach to reasonable attorney fees under civil rights statutes as a “sensible 
and fair approach” to determine reasonable attorney fees under the Minnesota Securities Act). 
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reasonable value of the legal services,’ the [fact-finders] should consider ‘all 
relevant circumstances.’”68 The Minnesota Supreme Court has identified six 
specific factors to be considered in determining reasonableness of attorney 
fees: (1) “the time and labor required;” (2) “the nature and difficulty of the 
responsibility assumed;” (3) “the amount involved and the results obtained;” 
(4) “the fees customarily charged for similar legal services;” (5) “the 
experience, reputation, and ability of counsel;” (6) and “the fee arrangement 
existing between counsel and client.”69 An examination of each of these 
factors reveals the practical problems that will arise in having juries decide 
these claims. 
 
1. Challenges During the Discovery Process 
 
The practical challenges of trying attorney-fee claims to a jury will 
begin early in the life of a lawsuit. In cases where the liability phase and 
attorney fee claim would be tried before a jury in the same trial or 
immediately after the same trial, discovery by the party seeking attorney-fee 
records will probably be sought early in the litigation. While extensive 
discovery of attorney-fee claims has not been commonplace when these 
claims were decided exclusively by judges, more comprehensive and 
detailed discovery requests could become commonplace in the post-United 
Prairie world because lawyers will be presenting their claims to lay juries. 
These lay jurors will have little to no experience with the billing practices 
and review of legal bills, and the attorney-fee claims will be presented in the 
same trial as the liability issues, or in cases where the attorney-fee issue is 
bifurcated: immediately after the liability phase.70 As a result, lawyers will 
approach discovery on the attorney-fee issue much like they approach 
discovery on any other damage claim.71 And because virtually everything on 
                                                 
68 Id. at 536 (quoting State v. Paulson, 188 N.W.2d 424, 426 (Minn. 1971)). 
69 Milner v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 748 N.W.2d 608, 621 (Minn. 2008). 
70 In cases where the attorney-fee claim is bifurcated, there will probably be the 
strong preference to use the same jury deciding the liability phase to decide the attorney-fee 
claim. Therefore, if liability is established, presentation of evidence on the attorney fee issue 
will most likely occur immediately after the jury returns a verdict on liability. This will be 
necessary to ensure that the court is not imposing any unnecessary hardship on the jury and 
minimizing the risk of a decision based on extrinsic information or extraneous influences. See 
United States v. Heppner, No. 05-94, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54148, at *12 (D. Minn. 2006) 
(“Extrinsic or extraneous influences may be grounds for impeaching a verdict, which include 
publicity received and discussed in the jury room, matters considered by the jury but not 
admitted into evidence, and communications or other contact between jurors and outside 
persons.”). 
71 The majority’s holding in United Prairie even characterized a claim for 
attorney fees based on a contract as an agreed element of damages under a contract. United 
Prairie, 813 N.W.2d at 59 (“When a party seeks attorney fees under the express provisions of 
a contract, the fees are an agreed element of damages available under the contract and are not 
collateral.”). 
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which a lawyer works becomes relevant to the attorney-fee issue, the broad 
scope of discovery permissible under Rule 26.02 will be expansive. 
Regardless of the degree, any expansion in connection with discovery of 
attorney-fee records could pose significant challenges to the trial lawyers and 
district court judges litigating and trying attorney-fee claims at the same time 
as, or immediately after, a claim for liability. 
 
a. Production of Detailed Billing Records 
 
One of the cornerstones of a successful attorney-fee claim is 
establishing and documenting the time and labor required of the attorneys.72 
Because a jury will be asked to evaluate “the time and labor required,” 
discovery will need to be conducted to allow the jury to scrutinize the 
attorney time records and determine if the attorney has presented sufficient 
documentation to support the attorney fee claim.73 In addition, because an 
attorney making a claim for attorney fees is required to “exercise ‘billing 
judgment’ . . . and maintain billing time records in a manner that will enable 
a reviewing [fact-finder] to identify distinct claims,” the bills submitted to 
the client, and paid, may be deemed discoverable under the broad scope of 
Rule 26.02 of the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure.74 
Courts may even require the defending party to produce its billing 
records.75 The discovery of billing records and client correspondence will 
raise significant concerns as this information will most likely contain 
attorney-client privileged communications, attorney work-product, mental 
impressions, and even litigation and trial strategy.76 These concerns are 
particularly problematic for the party seeking attorney fees as it has the 
                                                 
72 See supra text accompanying note 69 (detailing the factors courts look at when 
determining proper attorney fees). 
73 Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 430 n.3 (1983). 
74 Id. at 437 (“[T]he fee applicant bears the burden of establishing entitlement to 
an award and documenting the appropriate hours expended and hourly rates.”). 
75 Id. at 433; see also MINN. R. CIV. P. 26.02 (“Parties may obtain discovery 
regarding any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to a claim or defense of any party, 
including the existence, description, nature, custody, condition, and location of any books, 
documents, or other tangible things and the identity and location of persons having knowledge 
of any discoverable matter.”). 
76 The Advisory Committee comments to Minnesota Rule of General Practice 
119 specifically provided for in camera review or redaction of billing records to avoid this 
problem. MINN. GEN. R. PRAC. 119 advisory committee cmt. (1997) (“authoriz[ing] the court 
to review documentation required by the rule in camera” because in camera review or 
submission of redacted records “is often necessary given the sensitive nature of the required 
fee information and the need to protect the party entitled to attorneys’ fees from having to 
compromise its attorney’s thoughts, mental impressions, or other work product in order to 
support its fee application”). 
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ultimate burden to document and support its claim for fees.77 As a result, 
while parties seeking fees may be able to redact billing records and 
communications to not disclose privileged information and protected work-
product, they must balance the need for maintaining these privileges against 
the need to prove their claim for fees with sufficient certainty.78 
The production of the billing records may also reveal information 
about litigation and trial strategy that is not otherwise privileged. Rule 26.05 
imposes a duty upon parties to supplement their discovery responses as 
additional or corrective information becomes available. This means that 
parties will be required to provide opposing counsel with records showing 
time spent on the lawsuit as that information becomes available. And in the 
case where such bills are generated on a monthly basis and sent to clients, it 
may mean monthly updates of billing records to opposing counsel. Opposing 
counsel will then have the opportunity to not only discern litigation and trial 
strategies, but gauge how much the opposing party is spending on the 
lawsuit—information that could prove very useful in settlement negotiations. 
While there may be some inherent “fairness” in requiring a party 
seeking reimbursement for its attorney fees to support its claim through 
documents that may call for some waiver of privilege and work-product 
protection (or at least time spent redacting bills and records to ensure that 
any waiver is limited), how will courts deal with litigants who have not put 
their own fees at issue in a lawsuit? Will they be required to shoulder the 
same burden as the moving party by producing potentially privileged 
communications and work-product containing their lawyers’ mental 
impressions? And if deemed discoverable, will this information be deemed 
relevant and admissible at trial?  
In the only attorney-fee claim this author is aware of that has been 
tried to a jury in Minnesota, the party defending against the attorney-fee 
claim was not only required to produce its fee records, but the fees it incurred 
were a factor to be considered in determining the reasonable of the moving 
parties’ fees.79  
The discoverability and scope of the billing records and client 
communications that must be produced will continue to be one of the 
thorniest issues district court judges and lawyers will have to grapple with in 
this post-United Prairie landscape. 
                                                 
77 Hensley, 461 U.S. at 437 (“[T]he fee applicant bears the burden of establishing 
entitlement to an award and documenting the appropriate hours expended and hourly rates.”). 
78 In re Stisser, 818 N.W.2d 495, 509–10 (Minn. 2012) (affirming district court’s 
decision to deny attorney fees because the redacted invoices “did not supply the [opposing 
party] with any documentation on which to make a reasoned decision”); Bores v. Domino’s 
Pizza LLC, No. 05–2498, 2008 WL 4755834 (D. Minn. Oct. 27, 2008). 
79 See Jury Instructions, St. Jude, No. 62-CV-11-718, 2012 WL 8009745 (Minn. 
Dist. Ct. Sept.14, 2012) (identifying “the amount of attorneys’ fees incurred by Defendants” 
as a factor “[i]n determining the amount of attorneys’ fees [plaintiff] reasonably incurred”). 
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b. Depositions of Trial Counsel 
 
The production of billing records could very likely result in 
depositions of one or more of trial counsel, as these lawyers would know the 
most about the billing records and the work performed. Rule 3.7 of the 
Minnesota Rules of Professional Conduct prohibits a lawyer from serving as 
an “advocate at trial in which the lawyer is likely to be a necessary 
witness.”80 The Rule is designed to avoid misleading or confusing the fact-
finder because “[i]t may not be clear whether a statement by an advocate-
witness should be taken as proof or as an analysis of the proof.”81 While the 
Rule includes an exception for “testimony relat[ing] to the nature and value 
of legal services rendered in the case,” this exception is predicated on 
presentation of the evidence to a judge, not a jury: “[m]oreover, in such a 
situation the judge has firsthand knowledge of the motion in issue; hence, 
there is less dependence on the adversary process to test the credibility of the 
testimony.”82 
Lawyers served with deposition notices will not only be placed in the 
very unusual circumstance of having to offer testimony in the case they are 
litigating, but will have some tough decisions to make about the applicability 
of the exception to Rule 3.7 in an adversarial setting. 
 
c. Expert Testimony 
 
Before United Prairie, judges made determinations regarding the 
reasonableness of attorney-fee claims without the need for expert 
testimony.83 There have even been situations where juries deciding “free-
standing” attorney-fee claims have decided the reasonableness of attorney-
fee claims without the need for expert testimony.84 Lawyers will have to 
decide whether experts are necessary to prove and defend against a claim for 
attorney fees. Most cases with even some level of sophistication will most 
                                                 
80 MINN. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.7. 
81 Id. at cmt. 2 (“The tribunal has proper objection when the trier of fact may be 
confused or misled by a lawyer serving as both advocate and witness. The opposing party has 
proper objection where the combination of roles may prejudice that party’s rights in the 
litigation. A witness is required to testify on the basis of personal knowledge, while an 
advocate is expected to explain and comment on evidence given by others. It may not be clear 
whether a statement by an advocate-witness should be taken as proof or as an analysis of the 
proof.”). 
82 MINN. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.7; id. at cmt. 3. 
83 See, e.g., Tracy v. Perkins-Tracy Printing Co., 153 N.W.2d 241, 247 (Minn, 
1967) (holding that the trial judge was “justified” in deciding an attorney-fee claim “without 
the necessity of soliciting expert opinions on the question”). 
84 See Wojan v. Faul, 64 N.W.2d 140, 143 (Minn. 1954) (holding that in a case 
seeking recovery of fees expended in a separate lawsuit, “[t]here is no requirement that a jury 
award for attorneys’ fees . . . be based on expert testimony”). 
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likely result in the use of attorney-fee experts to help the jury understand the 
claim for attorney fees and testify about each of the relevant lodestar factors. 
 
2. Difficulties at Trial 
 
a. Trial Counsel as a Witness 
 
The ethical concerns posed by the potential application of Rule 3.7 
of the Minnesota Rules of Professional Conduct to depositions of trial 
counsel apply equally, if not more acutely, to trial counsel who may be called 
as witnesses during trial. As a result, trial lawyers will have to decide 
whether Rule 3.7 would bar them from serving as an advocate in the same 
trial in cases where attorney fee claims are presented simultaneously, or 
shortly after a claim for liability.85 This would be true even if the lawyer 
were able to present evidence on the attorney-fee claim through a different 
witness (e.g., client and expert witness), because opposing counsel may still 
want to cross-examine the lead counsel for a variety of fact-gathering and 
strategic reasons. 
Aside from the ethical questions posed, there are significant barriers 
to the credible presentation of evidence that lawyers trying cases without the 
assistance of co-counsel would face. Imagine the scenario where a lawyer in 
these circumstances deems it necessary to introduce evidence of the lawyer’s 
billing practices and rebut a specific allegation by opposing counsel 
regarding the lawyer’s bills. Does the lawyer have to get on the stand? Must 
the lawyer then elicit testimony in a question and answer format? The lawyer 
will then have the unenviable task of standing in front of the same jury to 
deliver closing remarks. What will the jury think of the lawyer after the 
lawyer spent time on the stand as a witness? And what becomes of the 
admonition in the comments to Rule 3.7 which cautions against prejudicing 
the opposing party by confusing the jury as to which statements of the lawyer 
“should be taken as proof or as an analysis of the proof?”86 
These are just a few examples of the numerous scenarios which will 
place lawyers in, at best, an uncomfortable position, and at worst, an ethical 
catch-22—a problem for which the Rules of Professional Conduct currently 
provide no clear guidance. 
 
b. Potential Relevance of Otherwise Inadmissible Evidence 
 
Minnesota law requires a fact-finder determining the reasonableness 
and amount of an attorney-fee award to account for “all relevant 
                                                 
85 MINN. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.7. 
86 See supra text accompanying notes 82–84 (explaining MINN. RULES OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT R. 3.7). 
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circumstances,” including “the time and labor required,” “the nature and 
difficulty of the responsibility assumed,” and “the amount involved and the 
results obtained.” Accordingly, the jury may be exposed to information that 
would otherwise be irrelevant and inadmissible to resolving the merits of the 
underlying dispute because that same information is necessary and relevant 
in deciding the attorney-fee claim. As a result of reviewing attorney fee 
records, jurors may learn that the parties engaged in settlement negotiations 
and discussions, what fee arrangements exist between the lawyer and client, 
fee arrangements with other clients, motion practice before the court, the 
types and number of motions brought by the parties and their success or 
failure, disputes over discovery and discovery motions, what evidence the 
parties sought to exclude, and a host of other matters.87 Consequently, the 
jury would be allowed “to look behind the curtain of a case presented to 
them . . . .”88 
 
c. Expert Testimony at Trial 
 
Expert testimony will most likely be necessary at trial to help jurors 
understand the intricacies of billing practices and decide the amount and 
reasonableness of the fee award.89 The inclusion of attorney-fee experts to 
educate jurors will certainly lead to higher costs and longer trials. 
                                                 
87 See, e.g., MINN. R. EVID. 408. 
88 Circuit (now Chief) Judge Dennis Jacobs of the Second Circuit described the 
problem as follows in a concurring opinion: 
[I]n my view, the only limitation on the practical ability of the 
jury to decide reasonable attorney’s fees in this case is that jurors cannot 
be expected to look behind the curtain of a case presented to them on the 
merits in order to decide the reasonable compensation of counsel. For 
jurors, the attorney’s fee issue will almost always be a different and 
disconcerting way of looking at the merits. Prevailing counsel should not 
have to disclose to the jury the need for in limine motions, the protective 
efforts employed in discovery, the pursuit of settlement, or the toil and 
calculation required to build a case that may have been promoted to the 
same jury as simple or self-evident. For these reasons, I agree that the 
amount of attorney’s fees reasonably incurred in a case tried to a jury 
cannot practically be decided by the jury and therefore presents an 
equitable question. 
McGuire, 1 F.3d at 1316–17. But see id. at 1316 (citations omitted) (observing “that [the] 
difficulty [articulated by Judge Jacobs] could be mitigated if not eliminated by bifurcating the 
issues of liability for fees and the amount of fees, the procedure followed in a case cited in the 
concurring opinion”). 
89 See supra notes 83–84 and accompanying text (explaining how expert 
testimony can be used to determine attorney fees). The majority in McGuire also referred to 
the complexities of educating a lay jury about billing practices. See McGuire, 1 F.3d at 1316 
(citations and footnote omitted) (“In contrast, if the parties submitted evidence of the amount 
of attorneys’ fees to a jury at trial, the time spent acculturating the jury to the mysteries of 
attorneys’ hourly rates and incidental charges, and cross-examining about those matters, 
would likely increase fees and generate inconsistent awards.”). 
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d. Estimating Attorney Fees Through the Close of Trial 
 
Because attorney fees will continue to be incurred through trial, 
litigants will be required to estimate the amount of fees through the end of 
trial. As the Second Circuit has observed: 
 
A jury would have to keep a running total of fees as they 
accrued through summations and then predict future fees 
from post-trial proceedings and motions. The prospect of 
such a trial evokes images of an attorney struggling to prove 
the amount of fees to which he is entitled, but never being 
able to do so because he must prove the value of his last 
words even as he speaks them, and also the value of words 
yet unuttered and unwritten.90 
 
e. Estimating Attorney Fees for Post-Trial Motions and Appellate Fees 
 
Any attempts to estimate attorney-fee costs for post-trial motions, 
appealing any portion of the verdict, or defending against any such appeal 
are even more problematic.91 As difficult as it may be to predict future fees 
through the end of trial, predicting fees for post-trial and appellate work may 
be more challenging; while there is certainty that trial counsel will incur fees 
through the closing argument on cases submitted to a jury, the type, number, 
and scope of post-trial and appellate work necessary would be speculative. 
This could result in lawyers getting underpaid if the appeal requires far more 
work than anticipated, or even more troubling, getting over-paid for work 
they never end up performing (e.g., where the jury awards fees for appellate 
work, but the losing party decides to not pursue an appeal).92 To complicate 
matters even further, juries will have to perform this task without knowing 
whether the lawyer and the lawyer’s client will succeed in any of the post-




                                                 
90 McGuire, 1 F.3d at 1316. 
91 Attorney fees have been awarded for appellate work pursuant to a statute 
authorizing an award of attorney fees. Johnson v. City of Shorewood, 531 N.W.2d 509, 511 
(Minn. Ct. App. 1995) (citing Hughes v. Sinclair Mktg., Inc., 375 N.W.2d 875, 880 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 1985), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 389 N.W.2d 194 (Minn. 1986)). 
92 While there is a possibility of “over-payments” in similar future lost-profits 
calculations (e.g., the plaintiff’s mitigation efforts were more successful than anticipated), it 
will be very easy to compare what actually happened on appeal (and the amount of fees) in a 
short period of time with absolute certainty. This may provoke the losing party to vacate the 
portion of the verdict on future fees and threaten the finality of the verdict. 
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f. Pre-Judgment Interest Under Minn. Stat. § 549.09 
 
Minn. Stat. § 549.09 provides, among other things, for the award of 
pre-judgment interest calculated “from the time of the commencement of an 
action.”93 The statute provides for certain exceptions.94 One of the exceptions 
expressly precludes pre-verdict interest “awarded on . . . that portion of any 
verdict . . . which is founded upon interest, or costs, disbursements, attorney 
fees, or other similar items added by the court or arbitrator.”95 
Does a court faced with an attorney-fee award from a jury apply the 
literal language of Minn. Stat. § 549.09 and find that the exception does not 
apply because there is no award of attorney fees “added by the court”?96 Or 
does the court look beyond the literal language of the statute? 
Minnesota’s pre-verdict interest statute has already proved to be 
problematic in the wake of United Prairie.97 One court that considered this 
issue since United Prairie has followed the plain language of the statute and 
refused to apply the exception.98 In doing so, the Court explained the very 
difficult decision it faced in the wake of United Prairie:  
 
There is no doubt that this is a troubling result that may 
require legislative attention. It seems indisputable that but 
for United Prairie Bank-Mountain Lake v. Haugen Nutrition 
& Equipment, LLC, 813 N.W.2d 49 (Minn. 2012) . . . the 
attorney’s fees sought by [Plaintiff] would have been ‘added 
by the court’ under Rule 119 of the general rules of practice. 
And if the attorney’s fees were ‘added by the court’ 
preverdict interest would not accrue on them, and 
[Defendant’s] ultimate liability would be about $140,000 
less than it is now. But the language of the statute is so plain 
. . . that the Court must apply the statute as written. The 
Court cannot conclude that [Defendant] has met these very 
exacting standards for deviating from clear and unambiguous 
language in this case.99 
                                                 
93 MINN. STAT. § 549.01, subd. 1(b) (2012). 
94 Id. 
95 Id., subd. 1(b)(5) (emphasis added). 
96 It is possible to read United Prairie broadly to conclude that a party is entitled 
to a jury trial includes a claim for costs. Regardless of the identity of the decision-maker, the 
problems posed by apparent divergence between the intent of the statute—enacted prior to 
United Prairie under the assumption that all claims for attorney fees would be presented to 
judges—and the literal language of the statute will need to be addressed. 
97 See St. Jude Medical S.C., Inc. v. Biosense Webster Inc., No. 62-CV-11-718, 
2012 WL 8009744 (Dec. 4, 2012) (ordering interest and taxation of costs and disbursements). 
98 Id. 
99 Id. at n.4. 
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3. The Increase in Complexity and Burden on the Trial Judge 
 
The uncertainty of adapting to a new system with a host of practical 
difficulties will unquestionably require more time from the district judges 
from the outset. In the pretrial stage, this will require increased involvement 
in pretrial case management, discovery management, and qualification of 
experts. At trial, this will mean a longer (and, in many cases, bifurcated), 
more complex trial that will require “time spent acculturating the jury to the 
mysteries of attorneys’ hourly rates and incidental charges, and cross-
examining about those matters, would likely increase fees and generate 
inconsistent awards.”100 The prospect of adding this new breed of cases and 
the resulting complexities to the dockets of already very busy district court 
judges with dwindling resources is problematic and frustrates the much-
needed work of the Minnesota Supreme Court Civil Justice Reform Task 
Force to reduce the costs of litigation and improve efficiency.101 
 
4. The Increased Costs of Trying a Lawsuit within a Lawsuit 
 
Litigation in the twenty-first century is slow and expensive.102 
Unfortunately, United Prairie has the potential to increase an already 
expensive proposition by turning the attorney-fee claim into something the 
Minnesota Supreme Court itself has cautioned against: “‘. . . a second major 
litigation.’”103 Moreover, the good work of the Minnesota Civil Justice 
Reform Task Force will be challenged because jury trials of attorney-fee 
claims will test the ability of trial judges and lawyers to manage cases cost 
effectively and efficiently. This will most likely lead to delays and higher 
                                                 
100 McGuire, 1 F.3d at 1316. 
101 See infra text accompanying notes 109–114 (describing the efforts of the Civil 
Justice Reform Task Force). 
102 As the Minnesota Civil Justice Task Force has observed, based on the 
experience of its own members and national survey data: 
The reasons for the high cost include excessive discovery and expense 
related to discovery management, particularly e-discovery. High litigation 
costs cause parties to forgo claims that do not exceed the litigation 
expenses. The most commonly cited monetary threshold for pursuing a 
case is $100,000. Some task force members feel that the local threshold 
may be closer to $200,000. The surveys and studies also present evidence 
of agreement that litigation costs also drive cases to settle for reasons 
unrelated to the substantive merits of the claims or defenses. 
MINN. CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM TASK FORCE, FINAL REPORT 11 (Dec. 23, 2011), 
http://archive.leg.state.mn.us/docs/2012/other/120214.pdf. 
103 Hippert v. Ritchie, No. A11-152, 2012 Minn. LEXIS 689, at *13 (Minn. Aug. 
16, 2012) (quoting Hensley, 461 U.S. at 437 (“‘[A] request for attorney’s fees should not 
result in a second major litigation’”)). 
22
Hamline Law Review, Vol. 37 [], Iss. 1, Art. 4
http://digitalcommons.hamline.edu/hlr/vol37/iss1/4
2014] ATTORNEY FEE CLAIMS 131 
costs, turning the attorney-fee claim into the proverbial tail wagging the 
dog.104 
 
5. Insufficient Safeguards against Erroneous Decision-Making 
 
The common law gives great deference to jury verdicts. Generally, 
after the jury has been discharged, no affidavit of a juror or a third person 
concerning a juror’s remarks will be received to impeach the verdict where 
the facts sought to be shown inherent in the verdict itself.105 Even an 
“attempt to show that the jurors misapprehended the evidence, or did not 
understand the charge of the court, or that they misconceived the legal 
consequences of their factual findings” cannot be used to impeach a jury 
verdict.106 Because courts and parties cannot inquire into how a jury reached 
its decision beyond an analysis of its responses to the verdict form jury 
decisions essentially become a “black box” that cannot be examined. 
While this approach has significant advantages and helps preserve 
finality and order in the judicial system, it poses a unique problem in trying 
attorney-fee claims in cases where bifurcation is not appropriate or 
possible.107 In these cases, there is a very real danger that a jury may, 
consciously or unconsciously, make a decision on liability and damages 
based on consideration of evidence only presented to prove the attorney-fee 
claim (e.g., deciding that the defendant is liable because it participated in 
settlement negotiations, deciding that the plaintiff should recover a smaller 
portion of its claim because it is receiving a large attorney fee award, or 
concluding that one of the parties is trying to “hide something” from the jury 
by moving to exclude certain evidence). Courts may use cautionary 
instructions to make clear that certain evidence should only be used for a 
limited purpose, but these warnings have been shown to be ineffective, and 
at times to even highlight the inadmissible evidence.108 As a result, even if 
                                                 
104 On November 24, 2010, Chief Justice Gildea, building on the efforts of former 
Chief Justice Eric Magnuson, formed the Minnesota Civil Justice Reform Task Force (“Task 
Force”). The Task Force described its mission as follows: 
The task force began its work by identifying the issues we face—namely 
excessive cost and delay that affect both administrative efficiency and the 
accessibility of our civil justice system. Our courts must remain relevant 
to Minnesota litigants by providing a forum for just, prompt, and 
inexpensive resolution of civil disputes. 
MINN. CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM TASK FORCE, supra note 102, at 4. 
105 Zimmerman v. Witte Transp. Co., 259 N.W.2d 260, 264 (Minn. 1977). 
106 Nebben v. Kosmalski, 239 N.W.2d 234, 238 (Minn. 1976) (citation omitted). 
107 “The rationale for the exclusion of juror testimony about a verdict or the 
deliberation process is to protect juror deliberations and thought processes from governmental 
and public scrutiny and to ensure the finality and certainty of verdicts.” Id. (citing 27 CHARLES 
ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 6072, at 403 (2d ed. 1990); 
MINN. R. EVID. 606, advisory committee cmt. (1989). 
108 Psychological studies show that: 
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courts use these safeguards, there is the very real possibility that jurors may 
be making decisions based on evidence otherwise never seen or heard by the 
jurors. Because of the potential threat to the integrity of the jury system, 
existing statutes and rules must be revised to help the district court judges, 
trial lawyers, and litigants. 
 
B. How to Help District Court Judges and Lawyers 
 
 While uncertainty in a common law system following a landmark 
decision is not unusual, the unique practical challenges posed by trying 
attorney-fees claims at the same time as a claim for liability sets this decision 
apart. Some of the uncertainty surrounding United Prairie (e.g., whether the 
defending party’s fees are discoverable and subsequently admissible at trial; 
whether United Prairie applies outside of the contractual attorney-fee 
context; what factors jurors may consider in determining the reasonableness 
of an attorney-fee claim) will need to be resolved by Minnesota’s appellate 
courts. 
 United Prairie, however, poses immediate procedural and case 
management challenges to district judges and trial lawyers. These pressing 
practical challenges already impact settlement negotiations, place an 
increased burden on the civil dockets of already understaffed district court 
judges, and will lead to an increase in litigation costs and delays in getting to 
trial—all matters of the utmost importance to Minnesota’s judges, lawyers, 
and citizens. 
 These functional challenges are best addressed by recognizing the 
problem, then cooperatively and proactively working to minimize its impact 
on the cost-effective and efficient administration of justice. This can begin 
with the thoughtful use of existing rules by lawyers and district court judges 
to efficiently manage cases. The Minnesota Supreme Court and its 
committees can ease the burden on the district court judges, lawyers, and 
litigants by considering revisions to court rules and practices and build on the 
July 1, 2013, amendments to the Minnesota Rules of General Practice.109  
                                                                                                                   
Limiting information that admonish jurors to ignore inadmissible 
information, or to use information for certain purposes but not others (e.g., 
that they may use a defendant’s prior record as an indicator of deception if 
the defendant testifies, but may not use prior record information as an 
indicator of guilt) have been shown not only to be ineffective, but also in 
some cases to produce a “backfire effect” . . . where jurors pay undue 
attention to inadmissible information after judicial admonitions. 
1 JOEL D. LIBERMAN & DANIEL A. KRAUSE, JURY PSYCHOLOGY: SOCIAL ASPECTS OF TRIAL 
PROCESSES, PSYCHOLOGY IN THE COURTROOM (MPG Books, Ltd. 2009). 
109 Order Adopting Amendments to the Rules of Civil Procedure and Rules of 
Practice Relating to the Civil Justice Reform Task Force (Minn. Feb. 4, 2013) [hereinafter 
Adopting Order], available at http://www.mncourts.gov/Documents/0/Public/Clerks_Office/ 
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 The Minnesota Lawyers Professional Responsibility Board should 
provide some clear guidance to lawyers on the applicability of Rule 3.7 to 
attorney-fee claims presented to juries.  
 Finally, the Minnesota legislature should amend Minn. Stat. § 549.01 
to make clear that litigants are not entitled to pre-verdict interest on attorney 
fees regardless of whether the fees are awarded by a court or a jury. 
 
1. Using Existing Rules to Cost-Effectively and Efficiently Manage Cases 
 
 The Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure were amended effective 
July 1, 2013.110 The amendments are designed to “facilitat[e] more cost 
effective and efficient civil case processing.”111 Among other things, the 
amendments: (1) permit judges to consider proportionality in determining the 
scope of discovery; (2) mandate automatic initial disclosures much like the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; (3) require a more focused discovery plan 
and conferences between the parties and with the court; (4) call for the 
expedited processing of nondispositive motions, and (5) a introduce a new 
Complex Case Program.112 
As a result, judges have more tools to better manage their civil 
dockets and reign in a steady rise in discovery costs.113 Many of these 
amendments and case management tools can be effectively used to help 
district judges and lawyers more efficiently manage attorney-fee claims that 
may be decided by juries.114 Although litigation of attorney-fee claims that 
may be submitted to a jury will most likely result in increased costs and 
delays in getting to trial, district court judges should consider using the new 
proportionality restrictions as a tool to minimize the likelihood that an 
attorney-fee claim turns into “a second major litigation.”115 
 
a. The Need for Early Case Management Conferences 
 
 Early case management and planning will be critical. The early 
discovery conferences, informational statements, and subsequent scheduling 
orders should be used to address the practical problems associated with scope 
of discovery, depositions of trial counsel, and protection of the attorney-
client privilege and work-product that may arise in attorney-fee claims which 





112 Id. at amended Rules 26.01, 26.02, 26.06, 37, 111, 115.04, and 146. 
113 See Adopting Order. 
114 Id. 
115 See supra text accompanying notes 103–104 (explaining how the current rules 
governing attorney-fee claims will lead to a “second major litigation”). 
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may be submitted to a jury. These early conferences, both between the 
parties and with the court, should give district court judges a preview of the 
potential issues and an opportunity to make some informed decisions about 




Bifurcation will help alleviate some of the difficulties in presenting 
an attorney-fee claim to a jury depending on how the case is bifurcated. For 
example, it would reduce (but not eliminate) the impact of having trial 
counsel as a witness; it would reduce (and probably eliminate) the dangers of 
having jurors’ liability verdict improperly influenced by evidence relevant to 
the attorney-fee claim (e.g., settlement negotiations); it would reduce (and 
probably eliminate) the dangers of presenting jurors with detailed 
information about attorney-fee records. The early case management 
conference can help the court and the parties decide whether bifurcation is 
appropriate and, if so, how the case should be bifurcated (liability and breach 
of contract damages exclusive of attorney fees first, followed by the 
attorney-fee phase; liability first, followed by breach of contract damages, 
including attorney fees).116 Although there may be reasons why bifurcation is 
not appropriate in some cases, early case management and solicitation of the 
parties’ positions on this issue will help the court better manage the litigation 
and provide the parties with some much needed predictability.  
 
c. District Courts Should Rule on Challenges to Attorney-Fee Jury Trial 
Demands as Soon as Practicable 
 
 The early case management conference will give the district judges 
enough information to determine if the parties disagree about the 
applicability of United Prairie. In particular, there will be a lot of uncertainty 
regarding the applicability of United Prairie beyond the contractual attorney-
fees context. Courts would be well-advised to decide whether any of the 
claims before it entitle a party demanding a jury trial on attorney fees to this 
right as soon as practicable. The early resolution of this decision, and any 
certification for interlocutory appeal, could conserve a lot of resources in 
cases where the court finds that there is no right to a jury trial on attorney 





                                                 
116 See Adopting Order. 
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d. Classifying Cases Involving Jury Trials on Attorney Fees as Complex 
Cases 
 
 Early case management conferences might also lead to the 
designation of the case as a “Complex Case” under new Minnesota Rule of 
General Practice 146 or appointment of a special master pursuant to Rule 
53.117 Both options would allow the court to more efficiently manage the 
discovery process and issue orders, reports, and recommendations on 
discovery matters related to the attorney-fee claim.118 
 
2. Amendments and Revisions to Existing Rules 
 
 In addition to the case management tools district court judges and 
lawyers can employ, several amendments and revisions to existing rules 
should be considered. 
 
a. Revisions to the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure and General Rules of 
Practice 
 
 The Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure should be revisited to 
determine if the mandatory supplementation requirements of Rule 26.05 
apply to the production of attorney-fee records, including billing statements 
and fee agreements.119 
 Minnesota Rule of General Practice 119 should be revised to account 
for the reality that not all claims for attorney fees will be made by motion.120 
The Supreme Court Advisory Committee on the General Rules of Practice 
should consider revising Rule 119 to identify a standard procedure for 
presenting attorney-fee claims to juries, much like the standard procedure 
outlined for such claims made by motion set out in the existing Rule 119. 
The revised Rule should provide a standardized set of guidelines district 
court judges and lawyers can use in managing attorney-fee claims. The 
revised Rule should provide enough certainty so the procedures employed 
maintain a base-level of uniformity across judges and courts, but provide 
enough flexibility for the district court judges to us their discretion to tailor 
the procedure to suit each case. 
 
b. Revisions to Minnesota Civil Jury Instruction Guide 
 
The Minnesota District Judge’s Association’s CIVJIG Committee 
should consider revisions to the jury instruction guide to include model 
                                                 
117 See id.; MINN. R. CIV. P. 53. 
118 Adopting Order. 
119 MINN. R. CIV. P. 26.05. 
120 MINN. R. GEN. PRAC. 119 (1998). 
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instructions and special verdict forms on the issue of attorney fees to 
juries.121 Aside from the benefits of standardizing the instructions given to 
juries, any comments or revised instructions by the Committee could provide 
district court judges and lawyers with some much needed guidance on 
whether the factors jurors are to consider in deciding attorney-fee claims are 
any different from the factors judges have used to resolve attorney-fee claims 
in the past.122 
 
3. Minn. Stat. § 549.09 Should be Amended 
 
 Minn. Stat. § 549.09 needs to be amended to make clear that the 
exception precluding pre-verdict interest “awarded on . . . that portion of any 
verdict . . . which is founded upon interest, or costs, disbursements, attorney 
fees, or other similar items added by the court or arbitrator” applies with 
equal force to an award made by a jury.123 Absent such a modification, 
district court judges have to: (1) apply the plain and unambiguous language 
of the statute and arguably undermine the spirit of the statute; (2) divine the 
legislature’s intent—because it concludes that the legislature never 
contemplated the possibility that anyone but the court or an arbitrator would 
be awarding attorney fees, costs, or disbursements; or (3) conclude that the 
term “court” applies to attorney fee awards by judges and juries. 
 
4. Minnesota Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 3.7 Should Be Revisited 
 
 The Lawyers Professional Responsibility Board should consider 
whether the exception outlined in Comment 3 to Rule 3.7 applies when the 
lawyer is presenting the information to a jury in the same proceeding in 
which the lawyer is also serving as an advocate for the lawyer’s client.124 
Absent such a consideration, lawyers compelled to testify, or called to testify 
at trial by opposing counsel, may be subject to, among other things, ethics 
complaints by unhappy clients, and serve as an unresolved question for all 
                                                 
121 4 & 4A MINN. PRACTICE SERIES (JURY INSTRUCTION GUIDES—CIVIL) (5th ed.). 
The CIVJIG Committee may find it appropriate to wait for direction from the appellate courts 
before proposing model instructions. 
122 For example, as discussed previously, in St. Jude—the first jury trial on the 
issue of attorney fees—the district court permitted the jury to consider “the amount of 
attorneys’ fees incurred by Defendants in th[e] case.” See Jury Instructions, supra note 79. 
This is significant because this factor was presented to the jury in addition to the factors 
otherwise routinely considered by judges deciding “the fees customarily charged for similar 
legal services.” Id. 
123 MINN. STAT. § 549.09, subd. 1(b)(5) (2012) (emphasis added). 
124 See supra text accompanying notes 82–84 (outlining Minnesota Rule of 
Professional Conduct 3.7 and its significance to determining attorney fees). 
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trial lawyers who take on a case with the potential for a jury trial on attorney 
fees.125 
 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
 
 It is undeniable that litigating and trying a claim for attorney fees to 
a jury in the same proceeding as, or immediately after, a claim for liability 
poses significant practical challenges to district court judges and lawyers. 
Many of these changes precipitated by United Prairie will lead to increased 
costs, require more time and effort from the district court in case 
management, and lead to potential delays in getting to trial. Although the 
district court judges and trial lawyers can use some of the existing rules to 
minimize the costs of litigation and delays, they will need some help. 
 This help can take a variety of forms, but can come in the form of 
amendments to the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure, the Minnesota 
General Rules of Practice, the Minnesota Jury Instructions Guide, the 
Minnesota Rules of Professional Conduct, and an amendment to Minnesota’s 
statute permitting interest on verdicts, awards, and judgments. Ultimately, 
the district court judges and trial lawyers will do what they do best and adapt, 






















                                                 
125 See supra text accompanying notes 82–84 (detailing how the Minnesota Rules 
of Professional Conduct prohibit lawyers from testifying in certain cases). 
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